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WORDNET: AN ELECTRONIC LEXICAL 
REFERENCE SYSTEM BASED ON THEORIES 
OF LEXICAL MEMORY 
George Miller, Christiane Fellbaum, Judy Kegl, and Katherine Miller* 
Introduction 
WordNet is an electronic lexical reference system for English, designed in 
accordance with psycholinguistic theories of the organization of human lexical 
memory. This novel lexical reference system for English is being developed in the 
form of an electronic database. Its design derives from psychological and linguistic 
theories about how lexical information is organized and stored in the memories of 
people who know English well and speak it fluently. The success of this 
experimental system would demonstrate the adequacy of the theories from which it 
derives, but even if those theories must be revised or replaced, the lexical database 
that is being developed in order to test them will be adaptable to a variety of 
practical applications. WordNet, supplemented on-line by machine-readable 
dictionaries and made available via a multi-window workstation, can be profitably 
incorporated into any task that is facilitated by easy access to lexical information. 
This research was supported in part by contract N00014-86-K-0492 
between the Office of Naval Research and Princeton University, in part by contract 
MDA 903-86-K-0242 between the Army Research Institute and Princeton University, 
and in part by a grant from the James S. McDonnell Foundation to Princeton 
University. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and 
should not be interpreted as representing official policies, either expressed or 
implied, of the Office of Naval Research, the Army Research Institute, the McDonnell 
Foundation, or Princeton University. WordNet represents work in progress and is 
not available for distribution. WordNet has benefited from the input of numerous 
lexicographers and programmers in addition to the authors: Amalia Bachmann, Marie 
Bienkowski, George Collier, Richard Beckwith, Melanie Cook, Derek Gross, Dan 
Teibel, and Anton Vishio. 
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Word knowledge is analyzed into: (1) the sound pattern, (2) the concept that 
the sound pattern can express, and (3) the association of sound and concept Sounds 
and concepts are learned differenûy: as a consequence, different kinds of lexical 
relations are established: (1) phonological (e.g., rhyme) and morphological relations 
(e.g., inflection, derivation, compounding) are word-specific, whereas (2) semantic 
relations (e.g., synonymy, subordination, part-whole) are truth-functional. 
Both kinds of relations are incorporated. In WordNet, a concept is 
represented by a set of synonyms that can be used, in appropriate contexts, to 
express it; other semantic relations are represented by labeled pointers between the 
related concepts. WordNet will test the adequacy of current ideas about the structure 
of the lexicon by testing whether a realistically large sample of the English lexicon 
can be represented in this way. 
The use of synonym sets is both an innovative and an expedient approach to 
dictionary design. Standard dictionaries develop uniform semantic representations 
for all the lexical items in English by systematizing the writing of sense 
definitions or by determining a set of linguistic primitives that constitute the 
meaning of lexical items. WordNet circumvents the writing and systematizing of 
sense definitions by representing concepts as relations among words arranged in a 
"vocabulary matrix," a giant network coding various relations by means of 
connections between words. It simply looks along a given row of the vocabulary 
matrix, notes all the words that can be used to express the same concept, and then 
substitutes that synonym set for the statement of the concept. If one accesses the 
dictionary via the horizontal word list, one gets a view of the polysemy of a word 
(all the different concepts that word can express). On the other hand, if one accesses 
the matrix from the vertical concept list, one gets a row containing all the different 
synonymous words that express a given concept 
Once the basic matrix is in place, an elaborate system of cross-referencing 
allows the coding of various relations between synonym sets, including relations of 
antonymy, superordination, subordination, part-whole, grading, presupposition. 
Finally, more complex relations termed "theories" can be encoded, including topics, 
semantic fields, and areas of discourse. WordNet is free from any requirement to 
encode all the information about a word in the confines of a single entry. 
Furthermore, the nonlinear nature of this net, together with the freedom afforded by 
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computer access, captures many important relations obscured by the formatting 
constraints of hand-held dictionaries. 
Psycholinguistic Issues 
What a language user must know and how that knowledge is organized are 
related but separable questions. In order to speak and understand any language, it is 
necessary to know the sounds and meanings of thousands of different lexical units 
— some idea of what a language user must know can be gathered from reading an 
ordinary desk dictionary. 
How that lexical knowledge is organized, however, is a much more difficult 
question. In a printed dictionary it is organized alphabetically. In a person's 
memory the organization is much more complex. Lexical memory must be so 
organized that the sounds and the contextually appropriate meanings of thousands of 
different words can be retrieved from memory at rapid rates. The conversational use 
of language would scarcely be possible unless the lexical memory system were well 
organized to support such rapid retrieval. The nature of this organization, and how 
it comes to be constructed during the process of learning a language, are basic 
questions for psycholinguistic research. Questions about the organization of lexical 
memory are easier to consider, however, if one first becomes clear about what a 
language user must know. 
A vocabulary matrix is sufficiently general to represent any lexicon, whether 
it exists in a person, in a book, or in a computer. It contains a representation of 
the phonological form of a word and a representation of the conceptual content of a 
word, along with the associative bond connecting them. The vocabulary matrix is 
not a complete model of a human language user's lexical knowledge, however. A 
good model of a person's lexical knowledge would have to include the phonological 
and morphological features of the words and the semantic and pragmatic relations 
among lexical concepts. 
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Lexical Relations 
The vocabulary matrix captures the basic structure of lexical memory, but it 
neglects the complex relations that exist between words. 
Phonological relations like rhyme, and morphological relations between 
derivatives (e.g. navy and naval, or high, higher, and highest ) or compounds (e.g., 
ship, board, and shipboard, or pocket, pick, and pickpocket) are real and 
recognizable to anyone who knows English but are not shown in the vocabulary 
matrix. Judgments of such relations between words depend on familiarity with the 
spoken patterns; they are rapid and accurate for highly practiced words, but slow 
and unreliable for infrequently used and unfamiliar words. 
Conceptual relations are not shown in the vocabulary matrix, either. A wide 
variety of such relations have been studied by psycholinguists (Chaffin & 
Herrmann, 1984). For example, subordination and superordination (e.g., a maple is 
a tree, and a tree is a plant), which are relations between concepts, not between 
words, do not appear in a simple listing of lexical concepts. Linguists and 
lexicographers refer to subordination as hyponymy. Hyponymy generates a 
hierarchical structure, a taxonomy, in the lexicon. 
The part-whole relation, called meronymy, is also a relation between 
concepts (Iris, Litowitz, & Evens, 1985). Simple examples are easily found. For 
example, a car has an engine, an engine has a carburetor, and a carburetor has a 
flutter valve; that is, flutter valve is a meronym of carburetor and carburetor is a 
meronym of engine. Like hyponymy, meronymy exhibits a hierarchical 
organization where, instead of the ISA relation, the HAS A relation is exploited. 
No adequate theory of the organization of lexical memory can ignore the 
strong formal relations between the columns or the strong semantic relations 
between the rows of the vocabulary matrix. Lexical relations must, therefore, be 
included in any electronic system that hopes to simulate the human memory 
structure. The vocabulary matrix is merely a skeleton; it must be fleshed out with 
many formal and conceptual relations. 
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Sources of Evidence 
Any theory must rest on a body of factual data. Two rather different kinds of 
factual data are available to support claims about the organization of lexical 
memory. One is linguistic: the data underlying theories of lexical organization are 
conveniently summarized in printed dictionaries and thesauruses. The second is 
psychological: a variety of experimental investigations have provided evidence for 
the psychological reality of the hypothesized mental structures. A few words about 
each should suffice to indicate the general character of the available data. 
First, the linguistic evidence. Dictionaries and thesauruses that summarize 
the relevant linguistic information derive ultimately from the recorded use of the 
language by native speakers, and from native speakers' subjective judgments. 
How words are strung together in sentences and larger units of discourse 
provides important information for a person — a child or a foreigner — trying to 
learn the vocabulary of a language. The ability to produce acceptable sentences is 
an important indicator that the writer or speaker knows the words they contain. 
Lexicographers collect such sentences, classify them according to the words they 
contain, and cite them as the bases for the definitions that they put in their 
dictionaries. When dealing with dead languages, the written corpus is the only 
evidence available. The inconvenience of this kind of evidence is that there are 
many different words, many of them relatively rare, and enormous quantities of text 
must sometimes be searched in order to turn up a mere handful of examples of 
sentences using the word that is being studied. 
In addition to corpus-based lexicography, some linguists and lexicographers 
also rely on native speaker intuition. Since native speakers are competent to 
produce and understand an indefinite variety of sentences containing any particular 
word, their implicit knowledge of the language provides a basis for subjective 
judgments that can be used as primary data. 
Both linguists and psychologists have developed methods to tap into the 
linguistic intuitions of others. For example, psychologists sometimes give native 
speakers a word and ask what other words it suggests, or they may constrain the 
person's associations by specific instructions, like "What is a kind of plant?" or 
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"List all the trees you can think of." Judgments that ISA or HASA relations hold 
take the form of judgments of the truth or falsity of such statements as "A maple is 
a tree" or "A gasoline engine has a carburetor." General world knowledge is 
involved in such judgments, of course. Linguists, on the other hand, are more 
likely to frame questions in terms of sentences, such as "Do Sjand S2 have the 
same meaning?" where S^and S2 are identical sentences except for a pair of words 
whose meanings are to be compared. Or they may ask for judgments of oddness: 
"pines and other maples" sounds odd, "trees and other maples" sounds odd, but 
"pines and other trees" does not 
The experimental evidence gathered by psychologists is of a different nature. 
By and large, psycholinguistic experiments presuppose the validity of the general 
structures that linguists and lexicographers have identified and try instead to test 
hypotheses concerning the way such structures arise or how they contribute to other 
cognitive processes. 
For example, linguists distinguish between open and closed class words. 
Open class words are nouns, verbs, adjectives, and most adverbs; the language has 
a great many different open class words, and new ones can easily be added to the 
vocabulary as needed. Closed class words are articles, prepositions, conjunctions, 
and some adverbs. English has a limited number of them (around 100); they 
provide important information about the syntactic structures of the sentences, and 
new ones are difficult to add to the language. Psychologists have adopted this 
distinction, calling open class items content words and closed class items function 
words. 
Psychologists have found a variety of behavioral data correlated with this 
distinction. For example, hesitations in conversational speech tend to occur before 
content words, not before function words (Goldman-Eisler, 1968). Or, to take a 
different example, good readers tend to direct their gaze at content words and to skip 
over function words. Since there are relatively few function words and they are used 
in every sentence, they occur much more frequently than do content words; 
consequently, psychologists translate the content/function distinction into a word-
frequency distinction. It is the infrequent and unpredictable words that cause a 
speaker to hesitate, and the less frequently a word is used, the more time a reader 
will spend looking at it (Carpenter & Just, 1983). 
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This word-frequency effect is also found in other experiments. In the lexical 
decision task, for example, readers are asked to decide as quickly as they can whether 
a particular string of letters spells an English word (Whaley, 1978). It has been 
found that the time required to say Yes to actual words decreases as the word's 
frequency of occurrence increases (Gordon, 1985). A wealth of such results 
strongly suggests that a person's access to lexical information in memory is faster 
and easier the more often the word has been encountered previously. 
The conceptual dimension of lexical memory has also been explored 
experimentally by psychologists. One of the landmark studies was the work of 
Collins & Quillian (1969). They reported that it takes people longer to judge the 
truth of the statement A canary is an animal than to judge A canary is a bird. They 
attributed such observations to the fact that bird is the immediate superordinate of 
canary, whereas animal is a more remote superordinate. 
Collins & Quillian's paper stimulated extensive research into the 
organization of semantic memory. That work need not be summarized here; an 
excellent review has been written by Smith (1978). It suffices for the present 
purpose to indicate what kinds of experimental evidence is available to support the 
claim that words are doubly entered in lexical memory. 
Although the work outlined in the present paper is not basic research in the 
sense that the experimental studies just mentioned clearly are, it can nevertheless 
contribute to the understanding of the organization of lexical memory. The 
contribution should follow from the inclusion of a sizeable fraction of the English 
lexicon, which can act as an antidote against premature enthusiasm. Psychological 
experiments are almost necessarily conducted with a small number of words and 
then the results are assumed (often implicitly) to generalize over the entire 
vocabulary. A failure to look for negative evidence can tempt one into serious 
mistakes. 
This temptation can be strong when lexical properties and relations are at 
issue. When only bits and pieces of lexical data have been examined, a theorist 
may begin to see patterns, to formulate hypotheses, and to search for examples to 
support those hypotheses. Moreover, supporting examples are usually found: it is 
easy to find words that will fit nicely into almost any pattern a reasonable person 
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might invent. But the fact that supporting examples can be found does not really 
test the hypothesis. A list of positive instances — even a long list — offers no 
assurance that there are no negative instances. Therefore, in order to avoid 
favoritism (even unconscious favoritism) for words that confirm one's hypothesis, 
it is advisable to test hypotheses against a large collection of words, a collection 
assembled in ignorance of the hypotheses in question. 
WordNet: An Implementation Of a Model of Lexical Organization 
WordNet is an electronic lexical reference system designed in accordance with 
the theories summarized above. The first step in creating WordNet was to invent 
an electronic version of the vocabulary matrix. 
Synonym Sets 
A major problem facing anyone who would construct a vocabulary matrix is 
how to represent all the various concepts that words can express. 
Lexicographers represent lexical concepts by circumlocution. That is to say, 
they use words to define words. Lexicographers take great pains to distinguish 
among different senses that a given word can be used to express, but they pay far 
less attention to establishing a common phrasing for the same sense when it 
appears in entries for different words. For example, in one widely used dictionary 
the same lexical concept is phrased as "inferior in quality or value" in the definition 
of poor and as "of little or less importance, value, or merit," in the definition of 
inferior. If WordNet represented the lexical concepts in the vocabulary matrix by 
definitional phrases borrowed from a conventional dictionary, many, perhaps most, 
synonymic relations would be overlooked. 
Some standard convention for expressing word senses is required. At first 
glance it might seem that there are many options to choose from. Many different 
notations for lexical concepts have been proposed (see, for example, Anderson, 
1976; Cullingford, 1986; Jackendoff, 1983; Katz, 1972; Miller & Johnson-
Laird, 1976; Norman & Rumelhart, 1975; Schank, 1972; Sowa, 1984; 
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Talmy,1985 ). It might be possible to identify one best suited for the present 
purpose. But such notations, although easier to standardize than the usual 
circumlocutions, have been worked out in detail for only small sets of English 
words, usually for whatever words happen to have been used for demonstration 
purposes. 
How, then, should the list of lexical concepts be constructed? In order to 
proceed with WordNet, we have used synonym sets to represent lexical concepts. 
That is to say, the identifier for the concept on any given row of the vocabulary 
matrix is given by the list of words that (in an appropriate context) can be used to 
express that concept. Actually, since the synonym sets will be numbered, each 
concept will be represented in the system by a number, but displayed to the user as 
a set of words having a shared meaning. 
It should be noted that synonym sets, unlike dictionary entries, do not have 
headwords. In a book of synonyms, one entry might have pipe as the headword, 
alphabetized under P with "tube" as its contents, and another entry with tube as the 
headword, alphabetized under T with "pipe" as its contents. In WordNet, the 
synonym set { pipe, tube,} stands as an elementary component, and neither word is 
ahead of the other. This practice has the advantage of symmetry: if x is a synonym 
of y, then y is a synonym of x. 
Because synonymy is so central to the design of WordNet, it resembles the 
electronic thesauruses that are now becoming available commercially (Raskin, 
1987). WordNet goes beyond those products, however, by incorporating conceptual 
relations other than synonymy. 
The Master List 
Once a satisfactory list of synonym sets is available, it is simple to index it. 
That is to say, an alphabetical listing of all the words in all the synonym sets can 
be constructed where each word is followed by the numbers of all the synonym sets 
of which it is a member. This list, which we have been referring to as the master 
list, can also contain information that is word-specific and not dependent on the 
concepts that the word can be used to express. For example, the master list 
includes information concerning the relative frequencies of use of each word. 
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Conceptual Relations 
As of June 1988, the WordNet files included approximately 11,500 different 
nouns organized into over 7,000 synonym sets; over 6,000 different verbs 
organized into over 4,000 synonym sets; and over 13,000 different adjectives 
organized into more than 10,000 synonym sets. That gave a total of over 29,500 
different words organized into approximately 21,000 synonym sets. The next step 
was to introduce relations between lexical concepts: not only semantic relations 
(Cruse, 1986; Evens et al , 1983; Lyons, 1977, ch. 9), but others as well. 
While additional synonym sets continue to be added, we are now introducing cross-
references designed to represent conceptual relations. 
Conceptual relations are represented in WordNet by cross-references between 
synonym sets. Each synonym set, therefore, will be followed by a list of the 
numbers of other synonym sets related to it in particular ways. 
Hyponymy, for example, can be introduced in WordNet by appending to a 
given synonym set one number that points to its superordinate term and other 
numbers that point to its hyponyms. The relation of meronymy is similar. Since 
meronymy generates a part-whole hierarchy that is structurally similar to a 
hyponymic hierarchy, it can be introduced in WordNet in a similar manner, by 
labeled cross-references. 
The Hyponymic Hierarchy 
Cognitive psychologists have been interested in lexical hierarchies at least 
since Collins & Quillian (1969) proposed them as a model of semantic memory. 
According to the theory, concepts are nodes linked by labeled arcs. Workers in 
artificial intelligence had observed that a hierarchy of nodes linked by ISA relations 
is an efficient storage system: since all of the properties attributed to a 
superordinate node are inherited by its hyponyms, those properties need be stored 
only once; they need not be stored separately with every hyponym. For example, 
when you are told that Cuthbert is a cat you know immediately that Cuthbert has 
four legs, fur, retractable claws, purrs, etc. It is not necessary to learn each of those 
properties separately. 
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During the past quarter century, therefore, the hyponymic hierarchy for 
nominal concepts has been widely exploited. For example, the psychologist Keil 
(1979) called it an "ontological tree" and used it to organize his observations of 
vocabulary growth in young children. Other workers have not found the hierarchy 
as neat and tidy as Keil did: the computer scientist Cullingford (1986) called it a 
"tangled hierarchy" (e.g., knife is a hyponym of both utensil and weapon ) and used 
it as the basic classification scheme underlying his natural language processing 
system. Others have proposed other variations. But even those who disagree about 
the details do agree on the general idea that some kind of semantic hierarchy is 
required in order to represent lexical knowledge. 
It is not difficult to construct demonstrations based on small fragments of 
the hyponymic hierarchy, but constructing it for a broad sample of the English 
lexicon is a formidable task. Much of the information required is contained in the 
defining phrases of standard dictionaries, where a common form of definition is: "x 
is a y that P," where x is a hyponym of y and P is a relative clause that 
distinguishes x from the other hyponyms of y. For example, The Longman's 
Dictionary of Contemporary English (Procter, 1978) says that a TREE is "a type of 
tall PLANT with a wooden trunk and branches, that lives for many years," from 
which it is obvious that TREE is a hyponym of PLANT. 
This kind of information can be extracted from a machine-readable dictionary 
(Amsler, 1980, 1981; Amsler & White, 1979; Chodorow, Byrd & Heidorn, 
1985). The results make it clear that lexicographers work with a fundamentally 
consistent semantic hierarchy. Unfortunately, however, definitions in standard 
dictionaries are not written with this analysis in mind, and fortuitous variations in 
the phraseology of related definitions sometimes obscure their relatedness. 
One feature of dictionaries that deserves comment is that it is much easier to 
identify superordinates from the defining phrases than to identify hyponyms. For 
example, the definition of tree will almost necessarily say that a tree is a plant, but 
it will not go on to say of apple, elm, fir, maple, pine , etc. that they are all trees; 
for that information a user must consult the individual entries for apple, elm, fir, 
etc., which presupposes that users already have the information that they are 
searching for. In WordNet moving down the hyponymic hierarchy should be as 
easy as moving up. 
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The hyponymic hierarchy is also apparent in standard thesauruses: Roget's 
International Thesaurus has 6-8 tiers of categories, going progressively from highly 
abstract generic categories to highly concrete specific categories. However, Roget 
and his successors were not slavishly devoted to the hyponymic relation, and careful 
judgment is sometimes required in order to extract the hyponymic relation from all 
the other information in an entry. For example, in Chapman's (1977) version of 
Roget's thesaurus the path from the root of the hierarchy out to one sense of the 
word pipe goes as follows: 
Class Two: Space 
III. Structure; Form 
B. Special Form 
255. Sphericity, Rotundity 
Nouns 
255.4 cylinder, cylindroid, cylindr(o)-, pipe, tube 
Although one can agree that a pipe is a cylinder and that a cylinder is a form, 
the rest of this path introduces other kinds of information. In particular, the more 
generic concepts seem rather arbitrary. Sedelow & Sedelow (1986) comment that 
there is much greater descriptive and analytic power, semantically, in the lower tiers 
of Roget's thesaurus. 
In most cases, the judgments required to settle questions about hyponymic 
relations are not difficult. In order to decide whether x is a hyponym of y, 
substitute them into a standard frame of the form: x ISA y, then judge, on the basis 
of general knowledge about such things, whether the resulting proposition is true 
or false. If it is true, then x can be accepted as a hyponym of y. Uncertainty about 
the truth value may complicate the judgment when the judge is not knowledgeable 
about x's and y 's or when highly abstract concepts are involved, e.g., is VIRTUE 
a hyponym of IDEA? But the large majority of cases are easily decided. 
By using a collection of dictionaries and thesauruses, liberally seasoned with 
linguistic intuitions, WordNet editors have introduced hyponymic relations into the 
synonym sets with little trouble. In some cases, a word that seems to have no 
obvious synonym can be tied into the semantic structure through its superordinate. 
Blunderbuss, for example, has no good synonym in English, but it can be 
integrated into WordNet as a hyponym of firearm. In other instances, an initial 
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synonym set can be reorganized; coordinate terms — names of trees, for example 
— that were entered initially as synonyms of tree, could, with the introduction of 
hyponymic relations, be entered more accurately as hyponyms — in this example, 
as hyponyms of tree. In general, the addition of hyponymy has had the effect of 
sharpening the semantic distinctions that can be drawn and, as a consequence, 
reducing the average size of the synonym sets. Considerable work is sometimes 
required to reach a satisfactory solution. In those cases care has been taken not to 
impose more order on WordNet than a literate speaker of English might find 
reasonably obvious. 
Antonymic Clusters 
Psychologists also have an interest in antonymy, since antonyms are so 
often used to anchor the ends of scales used in subjective judgments: good-bad, 
agree-disagree, right-wrong, and so on. Probably the most extensive use of 
antonyms for scaling purposes was Osgood, Suci, & Tannenbaum's (1957) attempt 
to map all concepts into a space whose coordinates were given by pairs of 
antonymous adjectives. 
Not every word has an antonym, of course. This relation is probably 
clearest between adjectives, although it is by no means limited to adjectives. The 
adjectival synonym sets were chosen as the most appropriate place to introduce 
antonymy into WordNet. 
The work began with the assumption that antonymy and synonymy are 
themselves opposites. That is to say, synonyms are words whose meanings are 
very similar, whereas antonyms are words whose meanings are very dissimilar. 
That assumption may suffice as long as one does not look too closely, but careful 
analysis reveals important differences. The long history of disagreement about the 
nature and definition of antonymy (Egan, 1984) should have been a warning, but 
the extent of the difference was not recognized until an attempt was made to 
represent antonymous pairs by symmetrical cross-references between contrasting 
synonym sets. 
The design of WordNet landed it, inadvertently, in the middle of a traditional 
argument about antonymy. Is an antonym (1) any one of several words that can be 
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opposed to a group of synonymous terms, or is it (2) a single word, or at most one 
of two or three words, that can be opposed to a given word? As originally 
conceived, WordNet incorporated assumption (1). That is to say, relatively large 
groups of synonyms were first compiled; then attempts were made to cross-
reference the antonymous sets. But it proved difficult to carry that program 
through. When synonym set Cj was put in opposition to synonym set Cj, not 
every word in Cj was an antonym of every word in Cj, and vice versa, and that fact 
made it difficult to judge whether the concepts represented by the synonym sets 
were truly antonymous. 
For example, the concept that is represented by the synonym set [damp, 
dank, drenched, moist, soaked, waterlogged, wet} seems to be antonymous to the 
concept that is represented by the synonym set { arid, baked, dehydrated, dessicated, 
parched, sere, withered] but few people would think of withered as an antonym of 
waterlogged, say, or of baked as an antonym of dank. Assumption (1) defines 
antonymy as a relation between lexical concepts, whereas assumption (2) defines 
antonymy as a relation between words. Judgments of antonymy are much easier to 
make between words than between concepts. 
The addition of antonymous relations sharpens considerably the semantic 
distinctions that are required. That is to say, the adoption of assumption (2) 
necessarily limits the number of words in many synonym sets to two or three. But 
the notion that antonymy is a relation between words rather than between concepts, 
finds support in the frequent use of morphology to signal antonymy: perfect-
imperfect, pleasant-unpleasant, powerful-powerless, superior-inferior, definite-
indefinite, etc., illustrate only a few of the ways in which derivational morphology 
serves this purpose. Or, to put it differently, prefixing un- to adjectives can result 
in new adjectives (pleasant-unpleasant ) in much the same way that adding en- to 
adjectives can result in causative verbs ( rich-enrich ). In both cases, the affix does 
important semantic work, but both dyads reflect formal relations between pairs of 
words. This fact is consistent with assumption (2), which defines antonymy as a 
relation between words. 
Moreover, if it is assumed that the morphological relations involved in 
particular antonymous pairs must be learned by repeated exposure and practice, 
much the way all formal (i.e., phonological and morphological) features of English 
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are learned, then other observations about antonyms could be explained. For 
example, although big-little and large-small are both antonymous pairs, it sounds 
odd to cross them: big-small and large-little. The explanation is that we have heard 
them paired one way much more frequently than the other. Although the cross is 
conceptually correct, it is morphologically unfamiliar. 
How can a conceptual definition of synonymy coexist with a formal 
conception of antonymy? Or, in more practical terms, how can a loose definition of 
synonymy be combined with a strict definition of antonymy? Solving this 
practical problem forced an interesting structure onto the adjective file: antonym 
pairs must form the basic skeleton of adjectival semantics, and this skeleton is 
fleshed out by those adjectives that have no obvious antonyms, but are similar to 
adjectives that do have antonyms. That is to say, another relation, dubbed semantic 
similarity, is introduced to preserve sets of several synonyms, but without 
precluding the one:one pairing of antonyms. 
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Table 1 
The antonymic cluster, wet-dry 
(Antonymic relation, *; similarity relation, &) 
wet, &1001a, &1002a, &1003a, *1005a,} 
damp, dank, moist, &1000a,} 
drenched, saturated, soaked, waterlogged, &1000a,} 
foggy, humid, misty, rainy, & 1000a, } 
drunk, slopped, tipsy, wet, * 1080a,} 
dry, *1000a, &1006a, &1007a, &1008a, &1009a, &1014a,} 
arid, &1005a,} 
dehydrated, dessicated, sere, withered, &1005a,} 
baked, parched, &1005a,} 
thirsty, &1005a,} 
dry, impassive, matter-of-fact, unemotional, * 1020a,} 
barren, dry, sterile, unproductive, * 1030a,} 
boring, dry, insipid, wearisome, &1040a, &1090a,} 
bare, dry, plain, unadorned, * 1060a,} 
anhydrous, & 1005a,} 
dry,&1110a,*1070a} 
emotional, •* 1010a,} 
fruitful, productive, * 101 la,} 
dull, 41012a, &1090a,} 
interesting, * 1090a,} 
adorned, fancy, * 1013a,} 
sweet, *1015a,&l 100a,} 
dry, sober, * 1004a } 
uninteresting, &1012a, &1040a, * 1050a,} 
sugary, *1110a, &1070a,} 
sugarless, &1015a, * 1100a,} 
ELECTRONIC LEXICAL REFERENCE 197 
The result is illustrated in Table 1 by the cluster of concepts around the 
antonymous pair wet-dry. (The 'a' following each number indicates that it is the 
name for an adjectival synonym set.) If dry in 1005a is consulted in search of an 
antonym, wet will be found in 1000a (and vice versa), whereas if dry in 1015a is 
consulted, the antonym in 1070a will be sweet. On the other hand, if 1005a is 
consulted for near synonyms of dry , all the words in 1006a, 1007a, 1008a, 1009a, 
and 1014a will be found. Thus, a narrow interpretation of antonymy can coexist 
with a broad interpretation of synonymy. Moreover, this form of representation 
poses no special problems for polysemous words: the dry that is the antonym of 
wet expresses a different concept from the dry that is the antonym of sweet, and 
different also from the dry that is similar to dull and uninteresting. 
Implicit in the adoption of this structure for WordNet is the hypothesis that 
native speakers of English have a similar organization of their lexical memory for 
antonyms. That hypothesis was explored in a series of experiments by Gross, 
Fischer, and Miller (1988). The first experiment asked native speakers of English 
to judge relations between different types of contrasting pairs of adjectives: direct 
antonyms, indirect antonyms, and unrelated adjectives. Direct antonyms are 
lexically opposed terms such as wet and dry. An indirect antonymic pair consists 
of an adjective and a near synonym of its direct antonym that does not have its own 
lexical antonym: dry and dank. Examples of unrelated adjectives are pleasant and 
scarlet, or regretful and clumsy. Native speakers of English were expected to judge 
direct antonymic pairs like wet-dry faster than indirect pairs like wet-parched. A 
second experiment asked subjects to distinguish direct antonyms from all other 
types of adjective pairs. The results of these experiments, although not as robust 
as might have been expected, were consistent with the hypothesis that semantic 
memory for adjectives is organized around bipolar attributes and that certain pairs 
(the direct antonyms) label the poles. 
Such experiments serve to illustrate one way that WordNet contributes to 
our understanding of the organization of lexical memory. As future work 
incorporates meronymy (work in progress by D. Teibel and G. Miller), association, 
and verb classification (Fellbaum and Kegl, to appear), further facets of the 
organization of lexical memory may become apparent. 
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Meronymy 
Meronymy, the part-whole relation, is another basic semantic relation 
between words and concepts. This relation turns out to play a prominent role in 
the noun component of the lexicon and is widely exploited in WordNet. Winston, 
Chaffin, and Herrmann (1988; also Chaffin, Herrmann, and Winston 1987) studied 
a wide variety of part-whole relations. 
The most easily identifiable examples of meronymy are found among words 
denoting concrete and countable entities. Body parts, for example, lend themselves 
well to part-whole classification: a finger is a part of a hand, a hand is a part of an 
arm, and an arm is a part of a body. 
Another kind of meronymy is represented by those cases where the concept 
of the whole exists only by virtue of the existence of a multiple of the parts and is 
conceptually and linguistically inseparable from them, as in the example a tree is a 
part of a forest. Thus, one can say a forest is many trees but not, for example, a 
body is many arms. 
In the lexicon of nouns referring to substances, meronymy takes on still 
another slightly different meaning. As Lyons (1977) points out, gold is both a 
substance and can also be a part of a compound matter. Thus, we can say both this 
substance is gold and gold is part of this substance. But the same does not hold for 
arm: Although we can say The finger is part of an arm, we cannot say This arm is 
a finger. 
Meronymy overlaps with hyponymy in the case of collective nouns such as 
furniture: While table is a kind of furniture, it is also part of furniture, in the sense 
that the concept furniture can be said to prototypically include the concept table. 
The classification of such collectives can, therefore, be problematic. 
In the realm of concrete and count nouns, meronymy permits the 
establishment of hierarchical structures in parallel with, but distinct from, 
hyponymic structures. Meronymic relations, like hyponymic relations, are also 
transitive, in that we can say that if x is a part of y, and y is a part of z, then x is 
also part of z. For example, foot is a meronym of leg and leg is a meronym body; 
therefore, foot is a meronym body. Bierwisch (1965) discusses redundancies in 
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these meronymic structures and asks to what extent they should be eliminated by 
rules. It would be interesting to test whether and how meronymic transitivity is 
represented in lexical memory: for example, to see whether subjects will easily 
associate two words that are distandy related by meronymy such as doorknob and 
house, and whether such associations require more time than those between less 
distandy related words like door and house. 
Interesting relations exist between the hyponymic hierarchy and the 
meronymic hierarchies. For example, it is not necessary to say that deck is a 
meronym of warship if it has already been said that deck is a meronym of the 
superordinate ship. Tversky & Hemenway (1984) argue that the appropriate level 
in the hyponymic hierarchy for entering part-whole relations is the level that has 
been called "basic" by anthropological linguists (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1966; 
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976). 
Hyponymy, antonymy, and meronymy reflect different aspects of the 
organization of human lexical memory and they all differ from synonymy. 
Consequently, the four relations must be represented differently in WordNet. Not 
until experience had been gained with this task, however, was the extent of their 
differences and interrelations appreciated. In the final section of this paper, we shall 
discuss the role of these relations in the verb lexicon, which presents a great 
challenge to any lexicographer. 
Semantic Relations in the Verb Lexicon 
At present, over 3,000 synonym sets of verbs have been compiled. They 
were initially classified into fifteen groups along the lines suggested in Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976). This classification follows very general but intuitively basic 
semantic criteria; thus, we have verbs of possession, communication, mental state 
and activity, motion, contact, change, competition, consumption, bodily functions, 
creation, psychological verbs, existence, social activities, perception, and natural 
events. The semantic relations of hyponymy, antonymy, and meronymy, that 
serve naturally to relate nouns and adjectives turn out to be less fitting for verbs. 
20 0 G. MILLER, C. FELLBAUM, J. KEGL ET K. MILLER 
Superficially, verbs do not seem to be easily represented by a hyponymic 
taxonomy. Rather than functioning as true hyponyms of a superordinate term, 
clusters of verbs seem to be related to a core or genus verb via a relation that often 
specifies the manner in which the subordinate is related to the superordinate. Thus, 
rather than bearing an ISA relation, a verb's relation to its genus term is 
expressable by means of a formula such as to VI is to V2 in some way. For 
example, to skulk is to walk in a stealthy manner; to sew is to make by drawing 
together with a needle and thread. 
Among the nouns that have been entered into WordNet so far, the 
hyponymic relation has tended to be inherited fairly regularly, so that a hierarchical 
tree could easily be constructed. However, the corresponding relation among verbs 
behaves quite differently with respect to inheritance. For example, while walking 
is a kind of traveling, and prowling and skulking are kinds of walking, it is rather 
odd to state that prowling and skulking are kinds of traveling. On the other hand, 
the hyponymy relation that exists between walking and traveling and, for example, 
marching and walking is inherited, so that we can say that marching is a kind of 
traveling. These observations suggest that both walking and verbs referring to 
kinds of walking have two principal semantic components, one of displacement 
(traveling) and one of manner. The relation to the hypernym travel is only 
inherited in those verbs where displacement constitutes the salient semantic 
component. This indicates that the inheritance relations among verbs are less 
straightforward than they are among nouns. 
Meronymy, which was found to play a significant role as a semantic relation 
among nouns, is not found in the same way among verbs. Its counterpart in the 
verb lexicon is a hierarchy-building relation that may be called semantic inclusion. 
Semantic inclusion is related to the logical notion of entailment. Thus, under the 
literal interpretation of dream, (1) entails (2), because when (1) holds, then (2) also 
holds: 
(1) John is dreaming 
(2) John is sleeping 
Note that this relation is different from the one just discussed: dreaming is 
not a kind of sleeping. While the kind-of relation always includes the entailment 
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relation (i.e., you cannot do x in a certain way without doing x itself), the converse 
is not true, as examples (1) and (2) show; hyponymy and inclusion are distinct and 
asymmetric relations. Thus, both the ISA (kind of) and the inclusion relations 
build hierarchical, partially overlapping structures in the verb lexicon. 
Hyponymy in the verb lexicon is complicated. There are two ways of 
thinking about the architecture of verb relations: (1) in terms of function; and (2) 
in terms of taxonomies. 
Using functional relations such as in the manner of, by means of and so 
forth, yields a nonhyponymic organization that relates a set of verbs to a base verb 
by mapping the base verb into a set of functions, yielding more specified verbs. In 
the following examples the base word is related to its more specified relatives by 
the functions by means of with a substance, and in the manner of, respectively: 
attach => [nail, tape, paste, glue, pin, sew, button, hook,...) 
cover => [butter, grease, oil, wax, paint, plaster,...} 
cook => [broil, fry, roast, boil, bake, steam,...} 
Notice that the more specified verbs listed in these examples are not merely 
types of the base verb. The function that relates them to the base verb is additive. 
The taxonomic perspective recognizes hyponymic relations among sets of 
verbs, analogous with the superordinate, basic, and subordinate levels that have 
been identified in the noun lexicon. A true superordinate of a basic level verb must 
contain the information contained by the relational functions. Thus, the 
superordinate of to nail is a verb meaning to attach by means of some instrument; 
the superordinate of to butter is to cover with some substance; and the 
superordinate of to broil is to cook in some manner. In contrast to noun 
taxonomies in English, the architecture of verb taxonomies is confounded by 
lexical gaps at the superordinate level.1 
1. This may be a language-specific property since languages such as 
Malayalam and American Sign Language (ASL) have clear lexical gaps in the 
superordinate level of their taxonomies that are beginning to be instantiated by a 
word formation process that forms coordinate compounds by stringing together 
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Consider the taxonomic organization of two standardly recognized verb 
classes: the CREATION class and the CHANGE-OF-STATE class (see Atkins, 
Kegl, and Levin,1988, for a discussion of the semantic and syntactic evidence for 
putting bake into both the CREATION class and the CHANGE-OF-STATE class.) 
CREATION CLASS 
genus: [MAKE] 
superordinate: MAKE (manner) [not lexicalized] 
basic object level: weave sew paint knit bake 
subordinate level: machine-knit, hand-knit 
CHANGE-OF-STATE CLASS 
genus: [ ] 
superordinate: COOK 
basic object level: broil fry boil roast stew 
A 
subordinate level: stir-fry, deep-fry 
Notice that the verb classes contain both a genus term and a superordinate. 
The genus term characterizes the class as a whole, picking out a set of sub-classes 
all of which share certain semantic and syntactic properties in common. Even 
though the previous schemata do not reflect it, both the CHANGE-OF-STATE and 
the CREATION classes contain a number of superordinates: 
prototypical basic level words. For example, in ASL, the superordinate 
corresponding to fruit is APPLEAQRANGE'NBANANA^TC (Klima and Bellugi, 1979). 
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CHANGE-OF-STATE: 
cook [basic: [broil, fry, roast, bake, boil,...}] 
change (integrity) [basic: [break, smash, crack, shatter,...}] 
change (shape) [basic: [bend, buckle,...}] 
change (size) [basic: [grow, shrink, expand,...}] 
change (consistency) [basic: [melt, liquefy, freeze,...}] 
etc. 
CREATION: 
create (by mental act) [basic: [contrive, invent, fabricate,...}] 
create (from raw material) [basic: [sew, bake, knit, paint,...}] 
create (by removal) [basic: [dig, drill, tear, bite, break,...}] 
The broad classification of these verbs into CHANGE-OF-STATE and 
CREATION classes is motivated by certain characteristics that members of each 
class share in common. For example, all the CHANGE-OF-STATE verbs allow 
the middle construction, whereas the CREATION verbs do not. 
(3) This glass shatters only under heavy pressure 
(4) This cardboard crushes easily 
(5) Cotton material shrinks when washed hot 
(6) M&Ms melt in your mouth, not in your hand 
(7) *Summer dresses sew easily 
(8) *In Antarctica, wells dig with great difficulty 
(9) *Theories invent with little effort 
(10) * Holes tear easily in this fabric 
The CHANGE-OF-STATE class characteristically allows an inchoative form 
and the CREATION class does not. Contrast the following sets of examples: 
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CHANGE-OF-STATE: 
(11) The water boiled 
(12) The sweater shrank 
(13) The bottle broke 
CREATION: 
(14) *The dress sewed 
(15) *The sweater knitted 
(16) *The portrait was painting 
A characteristic of CREATION verbs that is not shared by the CHANGE-
OF-STATE verbs involves the cooccurrence of a PP adjunct that indicates a source 
material: 
(17) Mary fabricated the story from rumors 
(18) Elaine sewed the dress from the finest of materials 
(19) Albert bit a piece from the apple 
(20) Mary baked a pie from the cherries she had picked 
(21) *John smashed shards from the pot 
(22) *Sue froze ice cubes from the water 
(23) *Mary broke smithereens from the vase 
(24) * John bent a cylinder from the cardboard 
Numerous other tests for class membership are explored in Fellbaum and Kegl (to 
appear), and an elaborate discussion of verb classes appears in Levin (1985). 
Notice that these two classes differ further at the basic level as well with 
regard to a transitivity alternation involving indefinite object deletion. However, 
the differences are reflected in only certain subclasses of verbs that can be 
distinguished at the superordinate level. These differences support a 
subclassification of verbs at the superordinate level. 
One subclass of creation verbs — those whose superordinate is create (from 
raw material) — easily permits indefinite object deletion, whereas others do not. 
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(25) John is knitting an afghan/John is knitting 
(26) Sam is painting a portrait/Sam is painting 
(27) Dick is fabricating lies/* Dick is fabricating 
(28) Mary tore a hole in her coat/*Mary tore 
Some CREATION and CHANGE-OF-STATE verbs allow deletion, but this 
is definite object deletion and occurs only with a strong context as in (29) and (30). 
For discussions of indefinite vs. definite object deletion see Atkins, Kegl, and 
Levin (1988) and Fillmore (1986). 
(29) a. Elaine is roasting a goose/*Elaine is roasting [Elaine = agent] 
b. What does Jane do in the kitchen? Well, today she is roasting 
(30) a. The man invented a new kind of mousetrap/*The man is 
inventing 
b. Edison invented the phonograph/Don't bother Edison, he's 
inventing 
Definite object deletion is not an inherent property of the CREATION class and the 
CHANGE-OF-STATE class per se, but rather is linked to the fact that members of 
the superordinate level of both these classes can function as activity verbs (like eat, 
read, dance, clean, etc.). In this activity verb realization the indefinite object can be 
omitted. Notice that at the subordinate level neither the CHANGE-OF-STATE nor 
CREATION classes allow indefinite object deletion. Allowing object deletion may 
be a property characteristic of a number of classes that are able to extend to become 
members of the activity class and to share syntactic and aspectual properties of that 
class (see Vendler, 1967; Dowty, 1979; Mittwoch, 1982). Nevertheless, the ease 
with which a verb can extend to another verb class may be related to its most basic 
class membership. 
The distinction between genus and superordinate manifests itself in several 
ways. First, the genus term is not truly part of the taxonomy in that it does not 
hold an ISA relation to verbs at the superordinate, basic, and subordinate levels. 
Second, the genus term does not participate in the syntactic alternations reflected by 
the superordinate and basic level verbs. Notice that this suggests that cook is a 
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lexicalized superordinate and that make and change are not. Consider the following 
examples: 
(31) John is cooking 
(32) *Mary is changing [Mary = agent] 
(33) *Mary is making 
The verb create, although a likely candidate for a lexicalized superordinate in the 
CREATION class, actually patterns more like a basic level term. It does not mean 
"make in some manner". Rather it is specific and refers to more artistic and 
aesthetic acts. Compare the specificity and infrequency of Don't bother me, I'm 
creating with the more generic Don't bother me, I'm cooking. 
Representing verb relations with taxonomies versus functions is a matter of 
choice. As far as we can determine, the two descriptions are equivalent. However, 
the philosophy behind the architecture of WordNet, which requires that words be 
represented in terms of their relations to other words, and not by definitions, 
functions, features, or frames, favors the use of taxonomies. A strict use of 
taxonomies will, in certain instances, reveal lexical holes, positions in the network 
where a hypernym is suggested by the overall structure but lacks a lexical 
instantiation. 
Exploring the feasibility of using taxonomies to represent the organization 
in the verb lexicon is the kind of experiment WordNet encourages. The idea is to 
see whether certain models or organizations suggested by small fragments of the 
lexicon remain viable when we consider the lexicon as a whole. With respect to 
this investigation, we have not yet coded enough of the verb lexicon to know for 
sure whether hyponymy relations truly deserve a place in the verb lexicon. 
So far as antonymy in the verb lexicon is concerned, we strongly suspect 
that for the most part it is a secondary semantic relation derived from adjectives (of 
manner, degree, or intensity) or from spatial relations, where it is primary. 
Whenever an antonymic relation cannot be imported from elsewhere in the lexicon, 
we might expect a verb pair to lack an antonymic relation. 
Members of two verb synonym sets are antonymous if the manner relation 
by which they differ is antonymic. For example, nibble and gorge are antonyms 
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because they are related to eat by little, slow and by much, fast, respectively. 
Antonymy also shows up systematically among verbs denoting a change from one 
state to another where each state can be related to a quality (e.gjighten and darken 
are antonyms by virtue of the antonymic relation that holds between the two 
adjectives from which they are derived). 
The construction of WordNet is based entirely on the conceptual relations 
that exist between the members of the three major categories noun, verb, and 
adjective. A psychological model of lexical memory, however, should also account 
for relations between words belonging to different categories. Therefore, besides an 
antonymy relation that is imported from other lexical categories, a unidirectional 
inclusion relation, and verb class hyponymy, WordNet recognizes an additional 
linking that assigns verbs to a particular semantic domain. For example, the verb 
fleece is linked to the noun sheep, and a polysemous verb like beat is readily 
disambiguated when associated with different semantic domains: culinary, musical, 
contact, competition, and so on. 
A speaker's lexical knowledge also includes knowledge of a word's syntactic 
use. Verbs are special. They form the backbone of the sentence and link in 
interesting ways to members of all the categories discussed (nouns, adjectives, and 
other verbs), as well as to function words and whole clauses. Thus, an important 
part of the lexical entry of a verb is its argument structure and selectional 
restrictions, that is, the number and kind of nouns it occurs with in a sentence. In 
this respect we stray from the basic constraint that words be represented only in 
relation to other words and we include syntactic and semantic frames. 
To include this kind of information in WordNet, each verb synonym set is 
matched with a frame specifying the semantic/syntactic restrictions (a combination 
of subcategorizations and selectional restrictions) of its members. Since WordNet 
is intended for use by linguistically unsophisticated users, the codings must be 
simple and straightforward, drawing upon lexical knowledge the user already 
possesses. The coding task also presents some interesting theoretical challenges. 
We do not know at this point how many frames will be needed to account for all 
the verbs on file, but we are attempting to keep the number small by giving only 
generic specifications: for example, NP human v NP nonhuman- On the other 
hand, it is hoped that the frames and their relations to the synonym sets can be 
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connected in some nonrandom fashion to the semantic relations among the verbs. 
Some of the semantic distinctions made in the relational structures of possession 
verbs, for example, can be shown to be reflected in a systematic way. The verbs 
relating to have occur in the frame NP human ^ ^ nonhuman ( e-S-> ^°^n 
owns a car. ) . 
The subordinates of take and give are additionally specified for a 
prepositional phrase with NP human m^ from anc* to , respectively. Moreover, the 
frames show the difference between those give subordinates that systematically 
participate in the dative alternation and those that do not (NP V NP NP vs. NP V 
NP to NP). 
Conclusion 
Significant semantic differences exist between the three major syntactic 
categories (noun, adjective, and verb). Words from the three categories enter into 
synonymy relations with other words, yet each category is strongly linked to one 
additional predominant relation and tends to resist systematic organization by means 
of other relations. Furthermore, existing models based on fragments of the lexicon 
need to be, and are being, examined on a large scale. The more we explore the 
potential implementation of these models, the more complex and rich the problem 
becomes. Being forced to not only consider those words that fit our theories and 
therefore come to mind easily, but also to account for the remainder of the lexicon 
as well, has yielded many insights we would never have stumbled upon otherwise. 
Our hope is that when considered as a whole, the massive contents of the lexicon 
will conspire to narrow down the possible descriptions to a more and more general, 
manageable, and empirically testable set. In addition, the existence in electronic 
form of a comprehensively coded lexicon should allow other researchers to extend 
and examine the architecture of the lexicon in new and interesting ways. 
George Miller, Christiane Fellbawn, Judy Kegl, and Katherine Miller 
Princeton University 
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